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WHEN Is BROAD Too BROAD? ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION OF GOVERNMENT
LIABILITY AT FEDERAL FACILITIES
RICHARD H. OTTINGER"
Although World War II concluded nearly a half-century ago, the
effects of the most destructive war in our history are being felt far beyond
the current political forum. Beyond the political effects so visible today
in the new Germany, Russia, and so painfully clear in Bosnia-Herzogovena
are the war's environmental effects.
One might imagine that the environmental impact of a conventional
war would be limited to the physical destruction of man-made structures
and loss of life and further restricted to the geographic region in which the
fighting took place. This is far from true, however, as the extent of
environmental damage becomes apparent at Department of Defense
("DOD") and Department of Energy ("DOE") facilities in the U.S. The
government primarily developed and used these facilities during the build-
up of the U.S. war machine in preparation for World War II and the
subsequent Cold War.'
In addition to its own munitions and research facilities, the federal
government, through the President's wartime executive power, used
differing degrees of force and coercion to enlist the resources and industrial
manufacturing expertise of private corporations to help in its preparation
for war.2 Fifty years later the U.S. Government is attempting to place the
burden of cleaning up the environmental disasters at these sights back onto
the shoulders of private industry, in some cases corporations that did not
even exist at the time the damage was done. Although the Government's
attempt at avoiding liability is entirely understandable, its actions seem
particularly insidious in light of the fact that the official estimate for a
complete cleanup of the DOD sites alone is forty billion dollars over a
* Mr. Ottinger received his B.A. in political science from Boston University in 1991 and
expects to receive his J.D. from the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of
William and Mary in May of 1995.
1. Cleaning Up Closing Bases Will Cost More, Take Longer than Estimated CBO Pre-
dicts, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1385 (Sept. 11, 1992).
2. See generally Van S. Katzman, Note, The Waste of War: Government CERCLA
Liability at World War II Facilities, 79 VA. L. REv. 1191, 1197-1200 (1993).
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span of thirty years, with some commentators predicting that actual costs
will reach up to ten times that amount.
Because of the growing tide of public concern for the environment
and the subsequent legislative reaction by Congress, the question most
often asked in response to this incredible problem is not "Should we clean
it up?" but instead "Who will pay?" Congress addressed the issue of
cleaning up the environment by enacting aggressive environmental policies
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 4 and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")5 embody the most
effective tools of the federal government's crusade against environmental
destruction.
.In each of these pieces of legislation, Congress has created a very
broad power for the government to regulate all past, current and future
environmental polluters. Included among these powers is the ability of the
federal government to determine potentially liable parties and classes of
parties. Although the liability originally created by these and other pieces
of environmental legislation was intentionally broad, many courts have
interpreted the legislation too narrowly when determining government
liability for its pollution at federal facilities.7
In the majority of cases attempting to enforce environmental laws
against the government for its own destructive activities, the government
has invoked the traditional defense of sovereign immunity Although
sovereign immunity is a well-entrenched doctrine designed to protect our
government's structure, it has frequently proven to be a barrier to
achieving Congress' true intent rather than protection from unreasonable
claims against the federal government.9
3. Keith Schneider, Military Has New Strategic Goal in Cleanup of Vast Toxic Waste,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5, 1991, at Al.
4. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
5. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining persons or entities liable under CERCLA); see also,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924 (defining persons or entities liable under RCRA).
7. See Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance with Environ-
mental Laws: Where Do We Go from Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 801, 837-41
(1993).
8. See discussion infra part I.C.
9. See id
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The primary goal of this article is to give an overview of the trends
in both the federal courts and in Congress of defining and clarifying the
statutory intent underlying the environmental legislation. This article will
also argue for a definite broadening of the interpretation given to the
government liability schemes created by Congress in the environmental
statutes. Most immediately, government liability can be increased through
a judicial and arguably justifiable narrowing of the application of the
defense of sovereign immunity. Ultimately, however, Congress needs to
address its own shortcomings by clarifying its intent for the courts and
government agencies.
As a result of the recent drastic changes in our nation's political
landscape resulting from the election of a Republican-dominated Congress,
the issues discussed in this article have become increasingly timely. The
new Congress is faced with several approaches to environmental issues in
general. First, Congress may play the hand that it has been dealt by
keeping the existing statutory schemes in their current forms. Second, the
new Congress could make the necessary clarification of intent as discussed
in this article. Third, Congress could take this opportunity to learn from
the mistakes made in the first generation of environmental legislation by
creating an entirely new approach to environmental issues.
Although the third option, if exercised correctly, could prove to be
the most efficient and effective method of furthering a more conservative
agenda, it seems rather unlikely given the amount of time and political
energy which such a change would require. It seems more likely,
therefore, that the greatest source of clarification and change will come in
the form of more minor adjustments to existing laws and regulations.
Part I of this paper will discuss the basic statutory schemes of
CERCLA and RCRA and the federal government's sovereign immunity
defense. Part II will briefly discuss two recent federal district court
opinions, Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp."0 and Redland Soccer
Club v. Department of the Army," prime examples of judicial legislation
that have created an exception to what should become a trend in expanding
government liability. The unfounded reasoning used by the courts in these
two cases sends a call to Congress to act quickly to close the exception
these courts have attempted to create. Part III will address Congress'
recent response to the Supreme Court case United States Department of
10. 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
11. 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
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Energy v. Ohio, 2 which includes a clarification of its intent to hold the
government liable through the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992
("FFCA"). 13 Part IV will look into the important decision FMC Corp. v.
United States Department of Commerce, 4 which has the potential to
expand government liability to the numerous privately owned facilities that
the DOD enlisted for use during the war effort in the 1940s. Finally, Part
V will argue that when substantial questions of statutory interpretation
arise, Congress needs to clarify its intent in order to provide courts the
opportunity and direction to follow an established and clear path toward
expanded government liability and a potentially cleaner, healthier
environment. Without action by Congress to clarify its intent, the courts
will most likely continue to infer from the environmental statutes that
Congress intended to place the entire burden of the cleanup process on the
shoulders of private entities 'while leaving the government free from
responsibility for its own actions.
I. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
A. RCRA and the Management of Hazardous Waste
Congress passed RCRA in 1976 to provide a statutory scheme for
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to regulate and control
current and future disposal of hazardous and solid wastes 5 which have the
potential to directly affect the quality of groundwater, often used as
drinking water.' 6 RCRA proceeds on the realistic notion that, while the
complete prevention of all hazardous waste disposal is impossible, effective
treatment of all such waste is unlikely. 7 RCRA's statutory scheme is
therefore not based on a series of bans but instead on a permitting process
which requires every waste disposer to obtain a permit before it may
12. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
13. Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505
(1992).
14. 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aft'd, 10 F.3d 987 (3d Cir. 1993).
15. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 6.3 (1977 & Supp.
1984), cited in Andrea Gross, Note, A Critique of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act
of 1992, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 691, 692 n.8 (1993).
16. RODGERS, supra note 15, § 4.3.
17. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6902.
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dispose of that waste.'" Within RCRA's permitting system, Congress
broadly defined waste disposers as "person[s]" in its attempt to prevent any
entity, either public or private, from avoiding potential liability.' 9
In an attempt to ease the federal government's burden, RCRA
encourages state involvement in the waste control process by providing
states the opportunity to apply to EPA to have a state plan supplant the
federal plan.20  This crossover of jurisdiction has created numerous
problems of enforcement, primarily when states attempt to enforce their
own, often more stringent requirements, on federal facilities.2'
In order to clearly define the liability of the federal government for
waste disposal at its own facilities, Congress included within RCRA a
provision that clearly requires that any entity of the federal government
must comply with:
[a]ll Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both
substantive and procedural (including any requirement for
permits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief
and such sanctions as may be imposed by a court to enforce
such relief) ... to the same extent, as any person is subject
to such requirements . . . . Neither the United States, nor
any agent, employee, or officer thereof, shall be immune or
exempt from any process or sanction of any State or
Federal Court with respect to the enforcement of any such
injunctive relief.22
Although this section intended to clarify the relationship between
individual states' regulations and federal facility compliance,23 it has
18. Id. § 6902.
19. Id. § 6903(15) (defining "person" to be "an individual, trust, firm, joint stock
company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.").
20. Id. § 6926.
21. See infra part III.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6961.
23. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
The court describes Congress' enactment of RCRA's then present form as a response to
the Supreme Court's decisions in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), and EPA v.
California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), (holding
Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not clearly and unambiguously
demonstrate congressional intent to subject federal facilities to state permit requirements).
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spawned its own questions about the amount and types of liability to which
Congress has intended the government to be subjected.24
B. CERCLA and Liability for Cleanup of Past Wrongs
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 for the purpose of cleaning up
existing hazardous waste sites and determining who should pay the
potentially enormous costs of those cleanups." One of the most powerful
and vital sections of CERCLA is its application of joint and severable
liability to: any present or past owner or operator of a facility where
hazardous wastes have been disposed, any person who "arranged for" the
disposal of any hazardous waste at a site, or any person who transported
waste to a site.26
Congress also provided CERCLA with a federal facilities
compliance section that appears to apply broad liability very much like the
federal compliance requirements in RCRA. Congress subsequently
amended CERCLA to require expressly federal facilities to comply with
all of the rules, regulations, standards and all other hazardous material
requirements established by EPA.27 Those amendments also created the
explicit authority for states to enforce removal and remedial actions at most
federal sites.28
Although Congress intended CERCLA to be a very broad and
powerful tool with which to clean up both public and private hazardous
waste sites, statutory interpretation of CERCLA has created an incredible
amount of litigation. Much of this litigation stems from what one court
called "vaguely drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory,
legislative history."29 The general rule of statutory construction in cases
involving federal laws is to look first to the language of the statute and
then to the legislative history if the statute is unclear.3" The lack of
legislative history promotes vastly differing views of Congress' true intent.
24. See infra part III.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (describing the liability created under the Act).
26. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
27. Id. § 9620(a)-(b), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a).
29. United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985). See generally Devel-
opments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1465 & n.1 (1986).
30. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 901-02 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984);
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 20 (1983)).
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Multiplying the potential cleanup costs of one site by DOD's more
than eighteen hundred installations accentuates the magnitude of the
government's potential liability under CERCLA. 3' The situation is even
more tenuous when one considers that courts have the power to assess such
high amounts of liability based on their interpretation of the meaning of a
single word in a statute. Along with this tenuous balance comes the
unfortunate potential for judicial abuse and judicial legislation. As
discussed below courts in several decisions have come perilously close to
overstepping the bounds of their power by offering interpretations of
statutes seemingly based more on the desired outcome than on the arguably
true and clear intent of Congress. 32
C. Sovereign Immunity as the Primary Government Defense33
The bases of sovereign immunity reach far beyond our nation's
history into our Anglo-Saxon political roots and the concept that "the King
can do no wrong. '34 This well established law in U.S. jurisprudence dates
from the Supreme Court's early interpretation of the Supremacy Clause3
and its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,B6 providing that the federal
government may not be sued absent its consent.37 Waiver of the
government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocal, 3 and even then
the court must strictly construe the waiver in favor of the sovereign and
not expand the doctrine "beyond what the language requires., 39
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has not gone without judicial
criticism, and yet, as evidenced by Justice Miller's comments in United
States v. Lee,4" "while the exemption of the United States... from being
subjected as defendant[] to ordinary actions in the courts has . . .been
31. Schneider, supra note 3.
32. See discussion infra parts II-IV.
33. See generally David W. Goewey, Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with
the RCRA and Other Environmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513 (1987).
34. See Lansing v. County of McLean, 359 N.E.2d 165, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
36. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
37. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586-87 (1941).
38. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
39. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983) (quoting Eastern Transp.
Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927)).
40. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
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repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the
reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established
doctrine."' Significant problems arise when courts apply sovereign
immunity blindly, without close consideration of the true congressional
intent behind the legislation. Although the inquiry into the justifications
for sovereign immunity has not been significantly furthered or discussed,
modem courts should consider, even if only narrowly, the context outside
the specific language of the statute to reach what might be a more accurate
interpretation of congressional intent. In attempting to effectuate Congress'
intent, courts should view both the statutory context of the language
applied and the factual context of the case at hand.
Both the mass of legislation passed each session and especially the
speed with which Congress drafted the environmental legislation precluded
Congress from articulating its intent as clearly as possible. Therefore, it
is judicious, as well as judicially efficient, to permit at least a small degree
of flexibility in the application of sovereign immunity. This makes even
more sense in light of the complex liability schemes in environmental
legislation and the relative lack of informative legislative history behind
acts such as CERCLA.
Despite the common law concept that the court should construe
statutory language against the drafter, it is not clear what policy concern
would cause a court to ignore the overall objective of a statute in order to
provide the government with a degree of sovereign immunity that Congress
almost certainly did not intend. In the end, the American taxpayer
shoulders the burden either directly through taxes used for the
government's cleanup of its sites or indirectly through lost jobs and
decreased productivity of private industry when forced to clean up sites it
is not responsible for polluting.
The next part discusses two federal district court cases which
exemplify successful attempts by the government to avoid liability for its
destructive activities by placing the costs of cleanup on the private parties
who presently own the sites.
41. Id. at 207.
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II. CURRENT OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT OF CERCLA
In contrast to the two decisions in FMC discussed in Part IV, the
district courts in Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.42 and Redland
Soccer Club v. Department of the Army43 have created a loophole through
which the government may avoid liability for environmental damage
caused at sites previously, but not currently, owned and controlled by the
government. Interpreting the "owner"/"operator" language of section
107(a)(4) of CERCLA," to include only current owners or operators, the
courts participated in semantic gymnastics and completely ignored the un-
derlying intent of Congress to effectuate a cleanup of hazardous waste sites
by the responsible parties.
A. Redland Soccer Club v. Department of the Army
In concluding that the United States had not waived its sovereign
immunity under CERCLA for sites it no longer owns or operates, the court
ignored the language of the Act as well as the fact that the government
was the owner or operator of the site at the time of contamination.45
The court based its decision on the tense used in section 120(a)(4),
which states "at facilities owned or operated" and "to facilities which are
not owned or operated." '46 The court read the two phrases in the present
tense, thereby clearly and unambiguously expressing congressional intent
to hold only current owners and operators liable.47 The plaintiff argued
that the court could read the first sentence in the past tense, placing liabili-
ty on the culpable government entity based on its actions in damaging the
environment rather than on the current ownership of the site. In reply to
this argument the court stated "[c]ommon sense and the rules of grammar
belie such an assertion. ' 48
42. 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
43. 801 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4).
45. Redland Soccer Club, 801 F. Supp. at 1436.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4).
47. Redland Soccer Club, 801 F. Supp. at 1436.
48. Id.
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When read in context, however, it is not at all clear that the first
sentence of section 120(a)(4) indicates present tense,49 and it is much less
apparent that Congress intended to limit liability to current owners and
operators. Furthermore, reading the second sentence in context clarifies
that, as a sentence of restriction, the sentence has the one purpose of re-
quiring states under their environmental laws to treat federal facilities and
privately owned or operated facilities on an equal basis and not to apply
more stringent requirements on the federal facilities." It is a stretch to
infer that either of the two sentences indicates a restrictive intent by
Congress to limit the potential liability of the federal government for its
own destructive behavior merely because the government has passed title
to the property.
When examined in light of the overall purpose of CERCLA, the
weakness of this argument becomes clearer. In a footnote, the court cited
the language of section 127(a)(2) which generally defines "owner" and
"operator" and places liability on "any person who at the time of the
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of. . . ."" The court
pointed to this language to demonstrate that Congress knew how to apply
liability to past owners or operators of sites but chose not to use the same
language in the federal facilities compliance section. According to the
court, this decision to use different language implied that Congress
intended to allow the government to avoid cleanup liability for sites it had
sold to private parties.52 The court appeared to ignore completely the
congressional intent indirectly expressed in the language it quoted from
section 127(a)(2) as well as the explicit language just prior to section
120(a)(4) in section 120(a)(1).
The language of section 127 (a)(2) clearly places liability for the
cleanup of a site on any party who owned or operated a facility during the
time in which hazardous materials were disposed at the site. This follows
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4), which reads in part, "State laws concerning removal and
remedial action, including State laws regarding enforcement, shall apply to removal and
remedial action at facilities owned or operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States .... .
50. Id. The conclusion of this subsection reads, "The preceding sentence shall not apply
to the extent a State law would apply any standard or requirement to such facilities which
is more stringent than the standards and requirements applicable to facilities which are not
owned or operated by any such department, agency, or instrumentality."
51. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
52. Redland Soccer Club, 801 F. Supp. at 1436 n.4.
[Vol. 19:131140
FEDERAL FACILITIES
directly from the underlying intent of Congress to impose joint and several
liability on any party involved with disposal at a site-the ultimate goal
being the effective cleanup of the site regardless of the insolvency of one
or more of the parties.5 3
The court's position that if Congress had intended the government
to be liable for cleanup at sites it had previously owned at the 'time of
disposal, it would have worded section 120(a)(4) precisely like section
127(a)(2), becomes even less tenable when one reads the language of
section 120(a)(4) in context. section 120(a)(1) provides in part that
[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality of the
United States (including the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and
comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the
same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any
nongovernmental entity, including liability under [CERCLA
section 120] section 9607 of this Title.54
Read in light of section 120(a)(1), it seems difficult to conclude that
Congress only meant section 120(a)(4) to apply to those facilities currently
owned or operated by the government. Even though section 120(a)(4)
provides for the special circumstance which arises when a party attempts
to enforce state law on a federal facility not listed on the National
Priorities List,55 there is no language suggesting congressional intent not
to hold the government liable. By strictly applying the rules of grammar
rather than adhering to congressional intent, it seems clear that the court
in Redland Soccer Club made a stretch to allow the government to avoid
atoning for its environmental sins.
B. Rospatch Jessco Corp. v. Chrysler Corp.56
Following closely on the heels of the Redland Soccer Club decision,
the District Court for the Western District of Michigan heard a contribution
action similar to that in Redland Soccer Club and applied many of the
53. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing the broad foundations of
CERCLA).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (emphasis added).
55. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the National Priorities List).
56. 829 F. Supp. 224 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
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same arguments made in Redland Soccer Club. The plaintiff corporation
brought an action seeking contribution for costs incurred during the
cleanup of soil and groundwater pursuant to both state and federal
environmental laws, primarily CERCLA. According to the plaintiffs
complaint, the Air Force was an owner/operator of the site from 1951 to
1954 and "exercised substantial control over and participation in the Site,
including direct involvement in directing, designing, and supervising
operations, and the generation and disposal of waste materials.""
Much like the arguments made in Redland Soccer Club, the
government claimed that Congress did not waive its sovereign immunity
to suit under state environmental laws in CERCLA section 120(a)(4)" for
facilities owned and operated in the past, despite the broad waiver of
sovereign immunity immediately preceding CERCLA section 120(a)(1).' 9
The court agreed with the government and found that Congress only
intended to waive the government's sovereign immunity for cleanup at
sites currently owned.6"
The court reached its decision after first discussing and rejecting the
lower court's finding of government liability under the same section of
CERCLA.6" The court then discussed the reading given to section
120(a)(4) by the court in Redland Soccer Club.62
57. Id. at 225 (quoting plaintiffs complaint 17).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4).
59. Id. § 9620(a)(1).
60. Rospatch Jessco, 829 F. Supp. at 227-29.
61. Id. at 227 (quoting Tenaya Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. United States Forest Serv., No.
CV-F-92-5375 REC at 5 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 1993)). The section cited by the court in
Rospatch Jessco states that:
[d]espite the holding of the Middle District of Pennsylvania in Redland, this
court finds that section 9620(a)(4) [CERCLA § 120(a)(4)] unambiguously and
unequivocally waives immunity in the case at bar. It is quite clear from the
language of section 9620(a)(4) that the waiver expressed therein is meant to
include all actions brought against the United States for harms which occur
during a time when the United States owns or operates a facility. This reading
preserves the present tense wording of the section (i.e. facilities which ARE
owned or operated by the United States when the harm occurs), and provides the
government a very clear limit on the waiver of sovereign immunity. As worded,
§ 9620(a)(4) specifically maintains sovereign immunity for 'past' harms, i.e.
those harms which occurred before the time when the government owned or op-
erated the facility.
Id. at 227.
62. Id. at 227-28.
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In coming to the same ultimate conclusion that Congress did not
waive sovereign immunity under section 120(a)(4), the court in Rospatch
Jessco accepted most of the arguments put forth in the Redland Soccer
Club decision. The court did not accept the finding in Redland Soccer
Club, however, that Congress expressly intended the tense of the language
in section 120(a)(4) to limit governmental liability and admitted that the
language in the first sentence is ambiguous regarding the requirement for
current ownership.63 In attempting to clear up the ambiguity, the court
looked not to the intent as expressed in section 120(a)(1) but to the second
sentence of section 120(a)(4). 64
The court conceded that the second sentence of section 120(a)(4)
is a sentence of limitation intended only to prevent a state from applying
stricter standards to federal rather than private facilities. The court then
played the same semantic game with tense as the court in Redland Soccer
Club to find "the comparison is casted in the present tense, suggesting that
the reference to 'facilities owned or operated by the United States' in the
first sentence should be construed in the present tense as well., 65  The
court tried to support this creative interpretation with a non-discussion of
the legislative history, discussing Congress' overall intent apparently
without paying any heed to its meaning. The court interpreted the brief
legislative history as indicating "that the waiver provision was enacted to
further strengthen the entire clean up program for the current federal
facilities under section 120 of CERCLA. ', 66
In viewing the arguments in Redland Soccer Club and Rospatch
Jessco, it seems rather shocking that these courts would have a reader
believe that Congress created section 120 as an additional provision to
ensure governmental compliance with CERCLA in the same fashion as
private corporations while at the same time allowing the government to
escape from liability by the mere happenstance of having disposed of the
property sometime subsequent to polluting it.
The simplistic and poorly constructed decisions in Redland Soccer
Club and Rospatch Jessco reveal that the courts' true rationale in reaching
their decisions was not to apply the sections of CERCLA as Congress
63. Id. at 228.
64. Id.
65. Id. See Redland Soccer Club, 801 F. Supp. at 1436.
66. Rospatch Jessco, 829 F. Supp. at 228 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H9561 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Fazio, primary author of section 120); 132 CONG. REC.
S14,895 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford)).
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designed them but instead to provide a loophole through which the
government and its agencies could avoid the potentially unlimited liability
for the cleanup of sites they polluted.
Clearly the courts have had a difficult time identifying Congress'
true intent and possibly have taken advantage of the opportunity to
interpret the law so as to reach their desired outcome. At this point,
Congress needs to step in and clarify its intent to prevent a simple
misreading from becoming a much greater miscarriage of justice. Part III
of the paper will discuss a recent case in which Congress has successfully
taken just such an action. Part IV discusses a case in which the court
successfully dealt with a similar legislative interpretation problem,
effectively preventing the need for congressional amendment.
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO COURT-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS OF
FEDERAL LIABILITY
The recent and somewhat controversial Supreme Court case, United
States Department of Energy v. Ohio,67 preents an example of judicial
inefficiency and requisite congressional reaction created by the overbroad
application of the defense of sovereign immunity in the realm of
environmental regulation. Perhaps the primary reason the Ohio decision
has received so much attention is not the controversial outcome of the case
but instead the quick and forceful congressional reaction to the outcome.
In response to the finding by the Supreme Court that neither the
Clean Water Act ("CWA")68 nor RCRA waived the federal government's
sovereign immunity from punitive civil fines,69 Congress enacted the FFCA
to ensure that federal facilities would be liable for their hazardous
wasteand therefore more likely to comply with RCRA and any other acts
or requirements included in its power.7 °
67. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
68. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387).
69. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1635 (1992).
70. See Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505
(1992) (reiterating Congress' intent to subject federal agencies and facilities to
environmental regulation). Section 102(a)(3) of the act states:
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and procedural requirements
referred to in this subsection include, but are not limited to, all administrative
orders and all civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether
such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for
[Vol. 19:131
FEDERAL FACILITIES
Ohio initiated the action by filing suit against the DOE and its
subcontractors for cleanup costs arising from the improper disposal of both
radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous wastes at the government's Feed
Materials Production Center in Fernald, Ohio, a 1,050 acre uranium
processing plant.7' DOE moved to dismiss, but the district court denied the
motion and found that the CWA and RCRA waived sovereign immunity
from punitive fines. This waiver allowed Ohio to levy punitive fines
against DOE, and indirectly against the federal government, for its
violation of state and federal environmental statutes.72
The district court based its finding first on its interpretation of the
language of RCRA section 6001,7 specifically the section providing that
government agencies are subject to "all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, both substantive and procedural."74 The court supplemented
its decision with the fact that Congress had already amended RCRA to
include section 6001 to clarify further its intent to hold federal facilities
liable.75
In reviewing Ohio,7 6 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that Congress waived the federal government's sovereign immunity
for civil punitive fines in the CWA but found that there was no such
express waiver in RCRA.77 The court distinguished the language of the
two acts based on the CWA's provision subjecting federal facilities to "all
requirements" and "sanctions" of federal and state law.7"The circuit court determined that the inclusion of the word
"sanctions" in the CWA and the lack of that language in RCRA provided
sufficient grounds to infer a congressional intent to exclude government
isolated, intermittent, or continuing violations. The United States hereby
expressly waives any immunity otherwise applicable to the United States with
respect to any such substantive or procedural requirement (including, but not
limited to, any injunctive relief, administrative order or civil or administrative
penalty or fine referred to in the preceding sentence, or reasonable service
charge).
Id. § 102(a)(3).
71. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th. Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 1065.
73. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
76. Ohio, 904 F.2d at 1058.
77. Id. at 1061. The court held that, while there is no general waiver, the citizen suit
provision does waive sovereign immunity. Id.
78. Id. at 1063.
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agencies from liability.79 The court then interpreted the parenthetical in
RCRA section 6001, listing the requirements to which the United States
may be subjected, as a "suggestive rather than exhaustive" list but
nevertheless refused to include monetary and civil penalties as intended by
Congress."0
In so finding the circuit court seemed to have discounted the overall
intent of the acts to regulate and hold liable responsible parties, both public
and private, for the illegal disposal of hazardous substances. The court cut
directly against the standard it established earlier by deciding that when
"determining whether a waiver is clear, the controlling factor is the
'underlying congressional policy."' 8' The court also ignored its additional
caution that, "[w]hen Congress enacts a clear waiver, that waiver should
not be 'thwarted by an unduly restrictive interpretation' in the courts.
8 2
In fact the appellate court did not heed its own advice in construing the
language of RCRA when it prevented the imposition of punitive civil fines
on the government for its acts at the installation.
In its review of Ohio,83 the Supreme Court engaged in an even
more pained and convoluted semantic exercise in attempting to avoid
placing liability on the responsible party. The Court offered an extensive
interpretation of how it would like the statutes to read but ignored the
underlying congressional intent to effectuate a thorough and efficient
cleanup of the environment.
The Court first focused on the citizen suit sections of the CWA and
RCRA. These provisions effectively authorize the district court to enforce
any statutory requirement against any violator. In addition, the court may
"order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both,
... and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [section 3008(a) of
RCRA]." 5 The Court accepted this section as enabling district courts to
levy punitive fines on violators but interpreted the section to exclude the
United States from liability. 6 The Court focused on the RCRA and CWA
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1059 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512,
521 (1984)).
82. Id. at 1060 (quoting Canadian Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 265 (1945)).
83. Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
84. See supra part L.A-B.
85. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634 (1992) (emphasis added).
86. Id.
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civil suit sections' failure to provide definitions of "person" and found
them not to include the United States.
87
The majority also focused on the definition of "sanction" in CWA
section 1323(a) providing for federal facilities compliance.8 Despite the
fact that the majority acknowledged the distinct possibility that "sanctions"
could by definition include civil penalties, it went on to write civil pen-
alties out of the plain meaning of the word, limiting its meaning in the
context of the CWA only to penalties associated with judicial or
administrative judgments.8 9 In his dissent Justice White described the
exercise used by the majority in limiting the meaning of the word
"sanction" as "analytic gymnastics."" Justice White continued by citing
the "ancient and sound rule of construction that each word in a statute
should, if possible, be given effect."9
Congress reacted quickly to the majority's decision not to hold the
government liable for civil penalties by enacting the FFCA.92 The FFCA
serves two primary purposes: first, it allows states to impose civil
penalties on the government for RCRA violations at federal facilities93 and
second, it authorizes EPA to impose administrative fines on federal
agencies for those violations.94
The FFCA illustrates the quick and efficient action Congress can
take when the judiciary does not effectuate its intent. The relative ease of
passing RCRA amendments should reinforce congressional use of statutory
change as a means of clarifying its intent, especially in light of the
extraordinary confusion surrounding the purpose of RCRA.
The next part provides an example of a situation where judicial
scrutiny of congressional intent spares Congress from acting to clarify its
intent. In this example, the courts evaluated the overall purpose of the
environmental legislation in deciding whether to apportion to the
government a share of clean-up costs of sites the government used during
World War II.
87. Id. at 1634-35.
88. Id. at 1636.
89. Id. at 1637.
90. Id. at 1641.
91. Id. (citing Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1002 (1990)).
92. See supra notes 13, 70; see generally Gross, supra note 15.
93. FFCA § 102(a).
94. Id. § 102(b).
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IV. A JUDICIALLY CREATED EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT
LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP OF WORLD WAR II MILITARY
INDUSTRIAL SITES-POSSIBLY ON THE WAY
-Beginning with the World War II effort and continuing throughout
all United States military confrontations to date, DOD has used its
enhanced wartime powers to engage numerous private corporations to help
in the buildup of the nation's defense system." The government is now
attempting to invoke its sovereign immunity to avoid contributing its
portion of the CERCLA cleanup costs at these sites.
The government seeks protection through an exception to
CERCLA's liability scheme by claiming that its actions were not similar
to those of a private party. This exception holds the government not liable
for pollution created by the government in its capacity as a "mere
regulator., 96 In many instances, however, the government's involvement
was pervasive and reached far beyond mere regulatory functions.
Although the wartime production system was crucial to our nation's
success, the entire burden for remedying the environmental destruction at
these sites should not be placed solely on the private companies. Instead
the parties should share the costs in relation to the amount of each party's
involvement. 97 Because the federal government has played such a large
95. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the background of
government enlistment of private industry during war buildup).
96. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 790 F. Supp. 94 (E.D. Pa. 1992). The court
found EPA not liable for the further release of hazardous materials because the release
occurred as a result of the cleanup effort and was therefore a result of its purely
regulatory role. Id. at 95-97. See also United States v. Atlas Minerals and Chems., Inc.,
797 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1992), a similar case in which the court found that "the
waiver [of sovereign immunity] contained in [CERCLA § 120(a)(1)] only applies to
situations in which the government has acted as a business" and "does not extend to
situations in which EPA has undertaken response or remedial actions at a hazardous waste
site." Id. at 420. This is because "when the EPA undertakes such actions, it is not acting
like a private party; it is acting to ameliorate a dangerous situation that, but for the prior
actions of the generators and transporters of the hazardous waste, would not exist." Id.
at 421. See also Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
97. Although CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4) provide for liability that has been almost univer-
sally interpreted as joint and several, § 107 also provides EPA and private parties the
ability to sue other potentially responsible parties for a contribution to the cleanup costs.
Before EPA can initiate a cleanup action it must create a list naming the "potentially
responsible parties" ("PRP"), which can then be used in subsequent cost recovery or con-
tribution suits. See Robert T. Lee, Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, andLiability Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 267, 310-11 (J. Gordon
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role in coercing these companies to engage in war production activities and
has also benefitted from the productivity of these companies, the federal
government should not be able to elude Congress' intent to hold it liable. 9
An example of a site where the government conducted extensive
wartime materials production is the Avtex site in Front Royal, Virginia.
FMC Corporation, the current owner of the facility, is suing the federal
government for indemnification for some portion of the present and future
cleanup costs already assessed against FMC.99 The Avtex site has been on
the National Priorities List since 1986.100
The FMC decision is one of the most important pending cases in
the area of government liability for military contractor non-compliance.
Not only is it necessary for an understanding of the eventual outcome of
federal liability for wartime production facilities, but the decision also
provides very plausible arguments for a more expansive reading of the
intent of federal environmental statutes to hold the government liable to the
same degree as private entities.
From 1942 to 1945 DOD exercised its enhanced wartime powers
to join in a cooperative project with the former owner of the Avtex
facility, American Viscose. The project was intended to increase greatly
the facility's production of high tenacity rayon, used during the war as a
substitute for tire rubber.'' The manufacturing process required the
treatment and disposal of hazardous waste. 0 2  At the time of the
government's involvement, there was no control or regulation of the
disposal which caused extensive environmental damage to the site."°3
Arbuckle et al. eds., 1993).
98. But see Katzmnan, supra note 2. The author argues in part that the financial benefits
to the private corporations should be given significant consideration when determining
federal/private liability. Id. The author also argues for severely limiting government
liability by narrowly interpreting CERCLA's "owner or operator" language, which would
exempt the government's involvement as mere regulation rather than active participation.
Id.
99. FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 786 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
100. Id. The National Priorities List ("NPL") is the list of sites created by EPA ranking
in descending order those sites most needing cleanup attention. 42 U.S.C. §
9605(a)(8)(B). A site must be on the NPL to qualify for long-term remedial action
financed by the Superfund. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1994). See generally Lee, supra
note 95, at 273-74.
101. FMC, 786 F. Supp. at 472.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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In its decision, the district court found that the United States was
an "operator" of the Avtex facility for the purpose of determining
CERCLA liability for the cleanup of the site. This finding would have
effectively dismantled the government's sovereign immunity by treating the
government as a private actor and leaving the government liable for the
cleanup of the sites it polluted. 4
Although withdrawn from record for rehearing, the appellate court's
affirmation of the district court's decision provides a significant amount of
guidance in how courts should look at cases involving hazardous waste
liability arising from a partnership between government and the private
sector. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding and further found that the government's activities would
also fulfill the definition of an "arranger" under the same CERCLA
section.' 0
The court based its decision on the nature and extent of the
activities engaged in by the government, differentiating between regulatory
and non-regulatory activities. 106 Applying an objective test, the court found
that an expansive use of the "'regulatory' exception.., would 'undermine
Congress' intent to ensure that those who benefit financially from a
commercial activity should internalize the health and environmental costs
of that activity into the costs of doing business.' If the United States, even
as a regulator, acts in a commercial capacity, it should be held responsible
for cleanup costs as a private business would be.'
10 7
The court employed two tests originally designed to determine a
parent corporation's degree of control over a subsidiary, to find the
government's actions to be those of a private commercial actor."8 Several
of the relevant factors include:
[w]hether the person or entity controlled the finances of the
facility; managed the employees of the facility; managed the
daily business operations of the facility; was responsible for
the maintenance of environmental control at the facility; and
conferred or received any commercial or economic benefit
104. Id. at 487.
105. FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 10 F.3d 987 (3d Cir. 1993),
withdrawn, [1994] 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,207 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 1993).
106. FMC, [1994] 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,209-20,211.
107. Id, at 20210 (quoting United States v. Azrael, 765 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D. Md.
1991)).
108. Id.
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from the facility, other than the payment or receipt of
taxes. 1
09
In applying the facts found by the district court.. to these factors, the
appellate court looked at the daily control the government exerted, as well
as the fact that American Viscose would not have been producing the high
tenacity rayon if not ordered to do so by the federal government. The
court then highlighted the presence of government inspectors in the plant
and the constant threat hanging over the manufacturer to comply or face
the possibility that the government would seize the facility entirely.",
In finding the government's activities to also be those of an
"arranger," the court focused first on the nature of the governmental
activity, including: building plants to supply raw materials to the facility,
arranging for an increased labor force and supervising employee conduct.
The government also controlled product-marketing and price. Taking all
of these factors into consideration, the appellate court found that the
government's participation in the partnership with American Viscose
greatly exceeded that required to find the government liable for a portion
of the cleanup costs."
2
This decision, although not binding, provides an informative and
well reasoned determination of congressional intent with regard to
CERCLA and demonstrates a conscious effort by a reviewing court to
avoid an unnecessarily narrow reading of the language of an environmental
statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The forefront of environmental law continues to advance at an
incredible pace. Litigation will continue to provide new questions and
answers, some correct and some incorrect. The solutions developed by the
courts are only temporary, however. Unless the new Congress is up to the
task of creating the next generation of environmental statutes, to
successfully attain the true goals contemplated by Congress, the new
Congress must remain constantly involved in the continuing development
109. Id. (citing United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 869 (D. Del.
1989)).
110. FMC, 786 F. Supp. at 472-85.
111. FMC, [1994] 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,211.
112. Id.
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of existing laws by adding to, simplifying and, most importantly, clarifying
these laws.
The FFCA is a prime example of the action that Congress must
take to fulfill its desire to clean up our environment. The Act states in no
uncertain terms that the government is to be responsible for its own
actions. If Congress does not continue to answer clearly the crucial
questions raised by the interpretations of federal law, the courts will
continue to construe the legislation narrowly and the defense of sovereign
immunity broadly.
Sovereign immunity plays an important historical as well as rational
role in protecting the government from claims to which it should not be
subjected. It is clear, however, from both the language of the
environmental statutes as well as Congress' reaction to the courts'
misconstruction of congressional intent to hold the government liable, that
in the case of environmental laws, courts should apply the defense less
mechanically.
One hopes that, in the near future, congressional clarification of
unclear statutes and regulations will obviate most of the questions
regarding congressional intent. In the interim, however, courts should
interpret environmental statutes mindful of the broad congressional intent
and commitment to clean up the environment and should hold the
government liable for the environmental destruction it has wreaked.
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